Chapter 10: Courage Must Be Used Wisely
After the Battle of Qianshi, the victorious Qi army, led by Bao Shuya, marched into the State of Lu, advancing swiftly toward Qufu. This alarmed Duke Zhuang of Lu greatly. Yet, to his surprise, the Qi forces did not intend to annihilate Lu but came to demand hostages. Bao Shuya sent a letter to Duke Zhuang, requesting that Prince Jiu be executed and that Zhao Hu and Guan Zhong be sent back to Qi. Faced with the overwhelming Qi army at his doorstep, Duke Zhuang, without much hesitation, ordered Prince Jiu’s execution. Upon hearing this, Zhao Hu took his own life to uphold his loyalty, while Guan Zhong was captured and escorted back to Qi.
In truth, Duke Zhuang was once again deceived by Qi. Bao Shuya and Guan Zhong were close friends and would never harm each other. The plan was Bao Shuya’s suggestion. When Duke Huan of Qi intended to appoint Bao Shuya as his prime minister, Bao Shuya resolutely declined, citing his own inadequacy. He understood that only a man of Guan Zhong’s extraordinary talent—one capable of managing both statecraft and military affairs—could assist Duke Huan in achieving greatness. Thus, he recommended Guan Zhong for the position.
Initially, Duke Huan held a grudge against Guan Zhong for an earlier slight, but Bao Shuya’s persistent endorsements piqued his interest in Guan Zhong’s abilities. Using the pretext of avenging his grievance, he requested Guan Zhong’s return from Lu. A man of exceptional intelligence, Guan Zhong naturally perceived Bao Shuya’s intentions. After three days of fasting, bathing, and changing clothes, Duke Huan personally visited the courier station to respectfully escort Guan Zhong to the palace to discuss governance. Guan Zhong, seizing the opportunity, resolved to serve Duke Huan.
However, the young and impetuous Duke Huan did not immediately heed Guan Zhong’s advice. Given Lu’s prior hostility and its support for Prince Jiu’s succession, Duke Huan harbored deep resentment toward Lu. Though victorious in the Battle of Qianshi, he was unsatisfied with mere defensive success. Ignoring Guan Zhong’s repeated counsel, he launched another campaign against Lu the following year.
At that time, Lu, still recovering from the earlier defeat, was indeed no match for Qi. A second loss could have doomed Lu, reducing it to a vassal state under Qi’s sway. Yet, a minor noble of Lu named Cao Gui changed the course of events. Knowing Duke Zhuang lacked the military acumen to lead Lu to victory, Cao Gui volunteered to join the battle.
Cao Gui famously engaged in a dialogue with Duke Zhuang, recorded in the ancient text “Zuo Zhuan”:
“Why do we fight?” the Duke asked.
“To protect our food and clothing; we dare not monopolize them but must share with others,” Cao Gui replied.
“That is a small kindness, but not universal, so the people do not follow,” the Duke said.
“We must offer sacrifices and jade gifts with sincerity, without adding to them,” Cao Gui responded.
“Small trust is not genuine; the spirits will not bless us,” the Duke lamented.
“Even if you cannot judge large or small disputes accurately, you must act with fairness,” Cao Gui insisted.
“That is loyalty; with this, we can fight. If so, I ask to follow your lead,” the Duke concluded.
Cao Gui rejected Duke Zhuang’s approach of winning hearts through minor favors and praying for divine protection, instead urging him to treat his people justly and openly to boost morale.
The Qi and Lu armies arrayed themselves at Changshao (present-day northeast of Qufu, Shandong). Following the Spring and Autumn period’s customary warfare, both sides first beat drums to rally their troops before engaging. Qi, confident in its superior numbers, beat the drums first and launched the attack. Duke Zhuang intended to respond with drumbeats but was stopped by Cao Gui. Seeing no response from Lu, Qi beat its drums again, still ignored. On the third drumbeat, Lu’s own drum sounded suddenly, and the two armies clashed. To everyone’s surprise, Qi suffered a crushing defeat. Cao Gui had timed the attack perfectly, applying the principle: “The first drumbeat builds momentum; the second wanes; the third exhausts.” This battle, known as the Battle of Changshao, remains a celebrated example in Chinese military history of the weak overcoming the strong.
Though previously suppressed by Qi, Lu’s fortunes revived after Changshao. Emboldened by the victory, Lu launched an attack on Song that same year, aiming to elevate its standing. This presented Duke Huan another pretext to invade Lu. Undeterred by the defeat at Changshao, he allied again with Song—who harbored hostility toward Lu—to wage war.
Duke Zhuang initially planned to hold his position, but Prince Yan proposed dividing the enemy and defeating them in parts. Compared to Qi’s disciplined forces, Song’s army was fraught with weaknesses. Defeating Song first would force Qi to retreat. Duke Zhuang ignored the advice, but Prince Yan acted independently. To boost morale, he disguised his horse with tiger skin and led a secret attack on Song through the southern gate. Upon learning of this, Duke Zhuang led the main force to join him. The Song army, unable to match the spirited Lu troops, suffered a heavy defeat at Chengqiu. Seeing this, Qi withdrew. The next year, Song sought revenge and attacked Lu again, but without Qi’s support, it was easily repelled. The two armies clashed at Zuan, where Lu struck first before Song could form ranks, routing them once more.
Song, dragged unwillingly into the Qi-Lu conflict and routed repeatedly, soon faced internal turmoil. During the Battle of Chengqiu, Song’s fierce general Nangong Changwan had been captured by Duke Zhuang with an arrow shot by Jin Pugu. Though later released after Song’s appeals, Nangong Changwan harbored a grudge. When Duke Min of Song mockingly remarked that, since Nangong had fallen prisoner to Lu, he would no longer respect him, this jest cost the Duke his life.
Humiliated and enraged, Nangong Changwan rebelled in the first year of King Xi of Zhou’s reign (682 BCE). He killed Duke Min at Mengze, then the Grand Minister Huadu near the eastern palace, installing Prince You as ruler. Song’s princes fled to Cao, quickly raising an army to suppress Nangong. Xiao Shudaixin and other royal clan members borrowed troops from Cao to return, killing Nangong’s kinsman Nangong Niu and later Prince You, placing Prince Yu—who had escaped to Bo—as the new Duke Huan of Song. Nangong Changwan and his lieutenant Meng Huo fled, seeking refuge in Chen and Wei. Song negotiated their return; though Wei initially wished to shelter Meng Huo, it relented under Minister Shi Qizi’s advice, handing him over. Chen, enticed by gifts from Song, intoxicated Nangong Changwan, bound him in oxhide, and sent him back. Both were ultimately executed.
This internal strife further weakened Song, leaving it unable to contend with neighboring states. Meanwhile, Duke Huan recognized that Qi’s current strength was insufficient for hegemony. He thus turned inward, initiating political and economic reforms under Guan Zhong’s leadership.
Though unsuccessful against Lu, this setback served as a wake-up call for the newly reigning Duke Huan. A wise ruler, he did not falter but realized that Qi’s path to dominance lay in domestic governance. He appointed Guan Zhong as minister, sparking comprehensive reforms across the state.
With the Eastern relocation of King Ping and the decline of the Zhou royal house, the patriarchal clan system had effectively collapsed, necessitating reforms to the registration system based on lineage. During the Spring and Autumn period, states distinguished between the capital region (“guo”) and the countryside (“ye”). Guan Zhong divided the capital into twenty-one districts (“xiang”), allocated among artisans, merchants, and the gentry: three artisan districts, three merchant districts, and fifteen gentry districts. The gentry districts were each managed by prominent noble families—the dukes of Qi, Gaozi, and Guozi—each overseeing five districts. Below the “xiang” were the “lian” (200 households), “li” (50 households), and “gui” (5 households).
The hierarchy was as follows: five households formed a “gui,” ten “gui” formed a “li,” four “li” formed a “lian,” and ten “lian” formed a “xiang.” These were managed respectively by a gui chief, li manager, lian chief, and xiang mayor (or xiang lord). Outside the capital, five “shu” districts, mainly agricultural, existed. Each “shu” contained counties (“xian”), townships (“xiang”), platoons (“zu”), and villages (“yi”). Thirty households made a “yi,” led by a yi magistrate; ten “yi” made a “zu,” led by a zu commander; ten “zu” made a “xiang,” led by a xiang commander; three “xiang” made a “xian,” led by a county commander; and ten “xian” made a “shu,” administered by high officials reporting directly to the court.
This system, termed “Can Guo Wu Bi,” abolished the feudal noble fiefdoms in favor of a structure akin to the later prefecture-county system. It provided a fundamental framework for daily administration, facilitating population management and tax collection while integrating directly with the military system. Because the tiers—gui, li, lian, xiang—were nested, they could be swiftly converted into military units during wartime.
According to Guan Zhong’s design, among the twenty-one districts under the capital, excluding the six artisan and merchant districts, the fifteen gentry districts supplied soldiers. Each household contributed one able-bodied man. Five households (one gui) provided five soldiers; one li (fifty households) provided fifty soldiers; one lian (two hundred households) provided two hundred soldiers; one xiang (two thousand households) provided two thousand soldiers; five xiang (ten thousand households) provided ten thousand soldiers, forming one army unit. The fifteen gentry districts, with thirty thousand households, thus supplied thirty thousand soldiers, divided into three armies. In peacetime, the administrative heads—gui chiefs, li managers, lian chiefs, and xiang mayors—served as military commanders in wartime, leading the soldiers from their regions. Duke Huan, Guozi, and Gaozi each commanded one army.
Furthermore, Guan Zhong improved soldier recruitment. The era had yet to see professional mercenaries; military service was a civic duty. Ordinary citizens became soldiers in wartime—the principle of “civil at home, soldier on the field” applied. Recognizing this, Guan Zhong designated the “shi” class as the primary military source.
The term “shi” often conjures images of powerless scholars in later centuries, but in the Spring and Autumn period, “shi” were quite different—more akin to medieval European knights. They were educated in the six arts: rites, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and arithmetic. A standard “shi” was both literate and martial, capable of governing and commanding. Compared to farmers, artisans, and merchants, they were of higher caliber.
This elevated the individual quality of Qi’s soldiers and boosted combat effectiveness. Moreover, the military system’s tight integration with civil administration allowed seamless transitions between governance and warfare, standardizing units and enhancing efficiency while reducing burdens on the populace.
To further improve combat readiness, Guan Zhong mandated seasonal hunting expeditions for the troops. These excursions honed soldiers’ fighting skills and helped control pests, maintaining security. He also forbade the “shi” from migrating freely and encouraged communal rituals and mutual care—sharing blessings and mourning together across generations. This fostered deep bonds among soldiers, ensuring unity in joy and sorrow, firm defense, and strong offense. Familiarity allowed them to distinguish friend from foe even by sound at night or appearance by day.
Of course, a powerful army required advanced weaponry. The advent of iron smelting during the Spring and Autumn period revolutionized agriculture and armaments. But how to quickly amass iron resources? Guan Zhong devised a “lenient punishment and redemption” policy: criminals could offset their sentences by paying with weapons, armor, or ore. Serious offenders could redeem their crimes with items equivalent in value to armor and chariots; lighter offenses with goods matching chariot and halberd value; minor crimes with copper or iron. This system both secured military supplies and increased state revenue while easing social tensions—a highly effective measure.
Beyond these reforms, Guan Zhong modified the old hereditary appointment system that assigned official posts based on bloodlines. Coming from a declining noble family himself, he understood that judging talent solely by lineage was outdated.
He selflessly recommended the “Five Outstanding Men” to Duke Huan: Xi Peng, eloquent and versed in rites; Ning Yue, knowledgeable in agriculture; Wang Yu Chengfu, brave and skilled in battle; Bin Xu Wu, honest and upright; and Dong Guo Ya, forthright and candid. All assumed important government roles. Later, Guan Zhong instituted a new selection process: local chiefs and district officials recommended talents upward; court ministers evaluated them; Duke Huan personally interrogated candidates—a “triple selection” system. Officials who suppressed or concealed talents were punished for “obstructing the worthy” or “obscuring the enlightened.”
Moreover, Guan Zhong urged Duke Huan to actively recruit talents from other states, dispatching eighty “wandering scholars” richly adorned and well-equipped to travel, seeking distinguished or reclusive sages to invite back. Qi soon teemed with talent and guests.
Through political and military reforms, Qi established an advanced government apparatus and a formidable army. Yet, sustaining the state machinery required a solid economic foundation. Accordingly, Guan Zhong undertook a series of economic reforms to strengthen the realm.